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As a kind of unwelcome, unavoidable, and malicious behavior, distributed denial of service (DDoS) is an ongoing issue in today’s
Internet as well as in some newly conceived future Internet architectures. Recently, a first step was made towards assessing DDoS
attacks inNamedDataNetworking (NDN)—oneof the promising Internet architectures in the upcoming big data era.Among them,
interest flooding attack (IFA) becomes one of the main serious problems. Enlightened by the extensive study on the possibility of
mitigating DDoS in today’s Internet by employingmicropayments, in this paper we address the possibility of introducing economic
levers, say, dynamic pricing mechanism, and so forth, for regulating IFA in NDN.
1. Introduction
Today’s Internet is a unique and unprecedented global success
story [1]. It is built based on TCP/IP architecture and assumes
that users and ends are trustable and intelligent, and themain
task of the Internet is to provide best effort service of packet
forwarding. This idea caters to the original requirements on
mutually connecting hosts and sharing distributed resources.
However, with the increasing and flourishing of the models
of computations and applications, the way people access and
utilize the Internet has changed dramatically, and today’s
Internet is reaching the limits of their senescence [1]. To keep
pace with changes and move the Internet into the future,
several projects have been initiated to design potential next-
generation Internet architectures [1].
In 1999, Adjie-Winoto et al. [2] proposed the concept of
“Content-Centric.” Afterwards, more researchers have been
paying efforts on this direction, and the idea of Information
Centric Networking (ICN) is widely accepted, now. With
ICN, each piece of information has a unique name as its
identity, by which users can request consuming desired
information, while the network needs only to manage the
flowing and cache these pieces of information according
users requests and information’s names. In other words, with
ICN, users need only to know what he/she wants, instead of
where the information is located.Names themselves carry less
information about routing than IP addresses used in today’s
Internet. Recently, big ICN research projects are mainly
distributed in Europe and America, such as Date-Oriented
Transfer (DOT) architecture [3], Data-Oriented Network
Architecture (DONA) [4], Routing on Flat Labels (ROFL) [5],
Internet Indirect Infrastructure (or i3 for short) [6], Publish-
Subscribe Internet Routing Paradigm (PSIRP) [7], Content-
Centric Networking (CCN) [8–10], 4WARD [11], and TRIAD
[1]. Among them, Content-Centric Networking (CCN) due
to Jacobson et al. [8–10] is currently a comparatively mature
architecture. In particular, CCNx [10] is an open-source suite
that enables more researchers to put forward their improve-
ments as well as CCN-based new applications [12]. In recent
years, the project Named Data Networking (NDN) [13],
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with thoroughly integrating the idea of ICN/CCN, made
remarkable progress, including a series of typical applications
[14, 15], as well as NS-3 friendly simulation tools for further
development [16]. In particular, in the upcoming big data era,
NDN will inevitably become one of the promising Internet
architectures due to is data-centric features.
In order to avoid past pitfalls, security experts insist that
we should treat security and privacy as fundamental require-
ments, and in particular resilience to denial of service (DoS)
and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks become
a major issue and deserve full attention during conceiving
next-generation Internet architectures [1]. Recently, Gasti
et al. [1] made a first step towards assessing DDoS attacks
in NDN. On one hand, many kinds of DoS/DDoS attacks
that have heavy impact on today’s Internet are successfully
bypassed due to subtleties and exactitude of designing of
NDN. In particular, the pullingmodel and the receiver-driven
mechanism used in NDN make most DoS/DDoS attacks
becoming aimless (i.e., it is difficult to find victims), and the
mechanism of reverse path content delivering makes most
DoS/DDoS attacks reflect to themselves. But as the proverb
goes, “every coin has its two sides,” NDN has not uprooted
DoS/DDoS attacks. Gasti et al. also conceived two kinds of
new DoS/DDoS attacks that intentionally utilize the features
of NDN: interest flooding attack (IFA) and content/cache
poisonous attack (CPA). Shortly afterwards, Atanasyev et al.
[17] showed that NDN’s inherent property of flow balancing
provides the basis for effectively mitigating IFA.
However, as far as we know, little attention is paid to
mitigating IFA inNDNby employingmicropayment systems.
But we know that in fighting against DoS/DDoS attacks
on today’s Internet, micropayments have been extensively
studied during the past two decades [18]. The idea of micro-
payments in fighting against DoS/DDoS attacks focuses on
incurring heavy penalties such as “virtual money” (say, CPU
cycles, memory/disk, bandwidth, etc.) to the DoS/DDoS
attackers. Therefore, in this paper, we try to probe the pos-
sibility of using economic levers, such as micropayments and
different pricing functions, to deal with the interest flooding
attacks in NDN. Our discussion mainly includes three parts:
a prototype of economic model for NDN, evaluation on
knowing types of micropayments in NDN, and assessing the
possible utilities of knowing pricing functions in NDN. In
addition, we also address the possibility of charging content
producers and relate this issue to the area of digital right
management (DRM).
The rest of content is organized as follows: in Section 2,
we give a brief introduction on NDN and IFA; in Section 3,
our main contribution, a prototype of economic model for
NDN, is proposed; finally, the concluding remarks are found
in Section 5.
2. Reviewing NDN and Interest
Flooding Attacks
As a typical instance of the broader ICN/CCN approach
to networking, NDN aims to evolve it into an architectural
framework for the future Internet [1]. NDN eliminates host-
based addressing and explicitly names content and thus
transforms content into a first-class entity [17]. Based on this
abstraction there is no explicit notion of “hosts” in NDN,
although their existence is assumed. Instead, interest and
content are the only two types of packets in NDN, and each
NDN router maintains three major data structures [1]:
(i) Pending Interest Table (PIT), a table containing cur-
rently unsatisfied interests and corresponding incom-
ing interfaces
(ii) Forwarding Interest Base (FIB), a table containing
name prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces
(iii) Content Store (CS), a buffer used for content caching
and retrieval
Based on these components, communication in NDN takes
the pull model: A consumer requests content by sending an
interest packet; if an entity (a router or a host) can fetch
from his CS a matched content object (i.e., named data
packet), the corresponding data packet will be returned to the
consumer by following the reverse path of the interest request
[17]. These features make NDN a receiver-driven, data-
centric communication protocol [17] and thus automatically
bypass several long-standing DoS/DDoS attacks, such as
direct flooding and reflector attacks through source address
spoofing [17].
However, in 2012, Gasti et al. conceived the so-called
interest flooding attacks (IFA) that utilize the features of
NDN: the adversary, with controlling of a large set of zombies,
invokes a large number of interest requests that are dis-
tributed closely in space, aiming to overflow PITs in routers,
preventing them from handling legitimate interests, and/or
to swamp the specific content producer(s) [1]. Gasti et al.
further identified three types of IFA based on the whether the
requested content exists and how the content produced [1]:
(I) Existing and static
(II) Dynamically generated
(III) Nonexistent
As for IFAwith type (I), the impact onNDN routers is limited
since in-network content caching mechanism will automat-
ically block subsequent same/similar interest requests not
to propagate to the producer(s). As for IFA with type (II),
the impact on NDN routers varies with respect to their
distance from the targeted content producer(s): the closer the
router to the producer(s), the greater the effect on its PIT
[1]. IFA with type (III) cannot incur significant overhead for
targeted content producer(s), but unsatisfied interest requests
will propagate to other NDN nodes and the corresponding
PIT entries will be occupied with longest time—until they
eventually expire [1].
3. A Prototype of Economic Model for NDN
It is a common belief that a resourcemay be abused if its users
incur little or no cost [19]. Thus, it is reasonable to introduce
payments or in generalmicropayments intoNDN for fighting
IFA. In fact, the idea of requiring the user to commit its
resources before requesting services was described early by
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Figure 2: Dropping interest request due to lack of PIT delay fee.
Dwork and Naor [20, 21]. As early as about 10 years ago,
Mankins et al. [18] once introduced dynamic resource pricing
models for mitigating distributed denial of service attacks.
But their models were conceived under the scenarios with
typical TCP/IP architectures, and thus some aspects need to
be updated for NDN architecture accordingly.
3.1. Business Logics. For mitigating IFA in NDN, the pro-
posed prototype of economic model is featured by the
following business logics:
(1) Suppose that there are trusted authorities in NDN,
and they do not only play the role of central banks for
issuing virtualmoney (VM) and related strategies, but
also conduct related tasks like auditing, accounting,
and so on (as analogy of reality, one might prefer to
assign the duties of auditing and accounting to other
trusted authorities, instead of banks; but this has no
essential effects on our prototype).
(2) Suppose each user or NDN node possesses certain
amount of VM at the beginning, and he/she can earn
more VM via publishing/forwarding useful contents,
looking up/forwarding interests for others.
(3) Each user is required to submit his/her prepayment
(PP), as long as prompting an interest request. This
prepayment includes two parts: PIT delay fee (PDF)
and content delivering fee (CDF).
(4) Upon receiving an interest request from some down-
streaming node that might be an end consumer or
a NDN router the NDN node 𝑖 looks up his/her
local cache for interest matching: if failing, thenmake
allowance for PIT delay fee, denoted by pdf 𝑖, and then
forward the interest request to all/part of upstreaming
nodes; if matched, then make allowance for content
delivering fee, denoted by cdf 𝑖, and then transfer the
content to the requester via a reverse path along the
interest request; and every NDN node 𝑗 in this path
will also make allowance for content delivering fee
cdf 𝑗 and meanwhile keep the content in his/her local
cache (see Figure 1).
(5) Each NDN node can stop and discard interests
forwarding if the left prepayment carried by the
request package is less than his/her charging on PIT
delay fee (see Figure 2). Similarly, each NDN node
can stop contents forwarding (i.e., the red crossing
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symbol in Figure 3) if the left prepayment is less
than his/her charging on content delivering fee. This
is reasonable since the forward node, as well as the
downstream nodes, has no obligation to delivering
packages without earnings. However, this node need
not immediately discard this kind of undelivered con-
tent. Instead, he/she can choose to cache this content
for short period and meanwhile send a short message
“CDF is insufficient” to the requester via a reverse
path along the interest request. This kind of short
message can be regarded as special “contents” packets
and the related content delivering fee is set to zero.
(6) PIT delay fee vanishes with its delay time in PIT
table. In other words, as for some item in a PIT table,
its PIT delay fee pdf 𝑖 will decrease along time elapse,
and the NDN node will discard this PIT item if this
pdf 𝑖 ≤ 0. When this occurs, the NDN node can also
send another short message “PDF vanishes” to the
requester via a reverse path along the interest request.
Similarly, this kind of short message can also be
regarded as special “contents” packets and the related
content delivering fee is set to zero. Meanwhile,
the two red crosses in Figure 4 indicate that the
related forwarding processes are also cancelled. This
is reasonable considering that some nodes might
become unreachable after he/she sends requests.
In this case, it is useful to space the PIT buffers for
accommodate newly coming requests.
(7) All involved economic behavior should be auditable
and accountable. Enforcing each NDN node to
sign his/her actions or responses related to VM
provides a good support for achieving postauditing
and accounting. Auditing and accounting should be
executed by some trusted authorities periodically.
Remark 1. Compared to the original NDN architecture, the
processes of delivering the above two kinds of short messages
are newly introduced. Based on the following observations,
we think these new additions are compatible with the original
NDN architecture and useful for improvement the perfor-
mance.
(i) If a NDN router node directly discards related PIT
entries in local PIT table but without sending the
short message “CDF is insufficient” or the short mes-
sage “PDF vanishes” then we return to the original
NDN settings.
(ii) Upon receiving either of these two special messages,
an end user can choose to resend the same inter-
est request with additional prepayments. Then, the
interested contents might be fetched quickly in the
midway.
(iii) Since these two short messages are transferred along
the reverse path of interest requests, the downstream-
ing NDN nodes can take actions correspondingly:
(a) If the corresponding PIT entry still stays in local
PIT table, then the NDN node can forward the
incoming short messages downwards and then
discard this PIT entry.
(b) Otherwise, if the corresponding PIT entry has
already been discarded from local PIT table,
then the NDN node no longer need forward
the incoming short messages downwards, since
before this occurs, it might have sent the short
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message “PDF vanishes” along the reverse of
the path of interest requests. Recursively, the
related end users have the chance to receive at
least one short message and this is sufficient for
prompting him/her to resend the same interest
request with additional payments.
Remark 2. Someone might argue whether the business logic
depicted in Figure 3 is reasonable. Seemingly, it is unfair
for the consumer because no service has been provided in
this case. Someone is even afraid of the fact that based on
this business logic a DoS attack can be mounted by sending
interest requests with calculated insufficient CDF. However,
we insist that the business logic depicted in Figure 3 is
reasonable:
(i) Firstly, it is unfair for NDN routing nodes if in
this case the consumer is not charged. Anyway,
the involved NDN routing nodes have already done
searching on related interests and even transferring
contents during the network, although the contents
have not reached the consumer. That is, we must
payNDNrouting nodes.Without charging consumer,
who pays that?
(ii) Secondly, even though the requested contents have
not reached the consumer, the consumer obtains a
useful message: CDF is insufficient. This message tell
two facts to the consumer: (a) the interest request
has been matched and (b) the requested content has
already been stored in the halfway—this is just the
core feature ofNDN.That is, the consumer can launch
the same interest request and then get the content
from the halfway.
(iii) Thirdly, suppose one node, denoted by A, tries to
mount a DoS attack by sending interest requests
with calculated insufficient CDF. That means the
prepayment of A should be large enough for routing
NDN nodes find the matched contents; otherwise,
the case in Figure 2, instead of the case in Figure 3,
occurs. Now, suppose that the content is dropped
in the halfway due to lack of CDF. Then, when A
launches the same interest request again, also with
insufficient CDF, now the request interest must be
matched during the halfway. Again and again, the
matched contents will come to A closer and closer.
That is, the effects of this kind of DoS attack towards
the whole network become less and less. Finally, when
the content has merely one hop to A, this kind of DoS
attack becomes useless.
3.2. Types of Micropayments. As addressed in [18], micropay-
ments can provide a useful side benefit by providing a uni-
form means of resource accounting, pricing, and arbitration.
But micropayments mechanisms must not impose an undue
performance penalty. That is, the performance should be, in
the absence of an attack, nearly comparable to a system that
does not use the payment mechanisms [18]. There have been
a number of digital payment and micropayment schemes to
Table 1: Compatibility of micropayments in NDN.
Types Features/requirements Compatibilities
Check/credit
card-like Online verification Poor
Cash-like Heavy local verification Poor
Scrip-based Light local verification Good √
BitCoin-like Lack of supply Poor
Memory-bound
functions
Roughly same speed over
different platforms Good √
Retraffic or
bandwidth as
payment
Clients are encouraged
to spend more
bandwidth
Poor
support digital exchanges [18, 22]. According to the descrip-
tion of the above prototype, we need fungible (or transferable)
digital payment schemes. Among them, check or credit card-
like schemes require some type of online verification of
payment—a server connects online much with a bank and
verifies the creditworthiness of the requester [18]. Apparently,
this strategy is not suited for NDN since the server might
become easily a bottle neck; cash-like schemes do not require
online verification but require significant computation or
memory usage overhead for validation [18] and thus may
not be compatible with NDN-oriented applications; scrip-
based system (such as Compaq’s Millicent [23]) is featured in
that the verification can be performed locally with very low
latency and thus it is friendly to NDN-oriented applications.
Note that today’s popular digital cash BitCoin [24] might not
be suited for NDN-oriented applications considering that it
becomesmore andmore difficult to obtain a “coin”—this sug-
gests that themechanismof BitCoin does not provide a steady
supply of currency with the flourishing of the applications in
future. However, moderately hard, memory-bound functions
suggested by Abadi et al. [19] might be useful. In particular,
this kind of functions is evaluated at about the same speed
on most popular systems like severs, laptops, PDAs, and so
forth [19]. Recently, Shen et al. [21] suggested using retraffic
strategy for fighting against DDoS in TCP/IP architecture.
However, this method does not only rely on middle-software
that is fixed in front of the server, but also request the client
to send more traffic (i.e., retraffic) for a single request. After
that, Khanna et al. [25] also proposed using bandwidth as
currency. That is, in order to get service, the clients are
encouraged to spend more bandwidth by either sending
repeated requests or sending dummy bytes on a separate
channel to enable a bandwidth auction [25]. However, as
for NDN architecture, we state as a fact two obstacles for
deploying these twomethods: firstly, interest request in NDN
is forwarded by NDN router nodes and the upstreaming
nodes need not recognize the end client, and thus requesting
the interrouter nodes to spend more bandwidth is irrational;
secondly, where to deploy the newly introduced middle-
software is not only a cost problem, but also an challenge
with respect to modifying NDN architecture. Therefore, we
are inclined not to use these two methods in NDN. In brief,
we summarize the potential NDN compatibilities of different
kinds of micropayments in Table 1.
6 Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Adversary
Legitimate
Mediate
Producer
R(1) R(2) R(3) R(4)
A
(a) A tree-like topology (b) A net-like topology
Figure 5: Topologies for simulation.
3.3. Pricing Functions. It is also another common sense that
we should employ a dynamic pricing strategy for each service,
instead of a fixed pricing function for all services [18]. How-
ever, detailed addressing of this issue goes out the scope of this
paper. As the first step towards analyzing possibility of using
economic levers in NDN, we would like to abstractly classify
all services in NDN into two categories: interest looking up
and content delivering. In otherwords, from the view ofNDN
router nodes, all interests/contents in the above prototype
have nomuch difference from random numbers.Their duties
are just to look up, to forward, and to cache them. After that,
these NDN routers will obtain what they deserved (i.e., VM)
according certain charging policies. Note that this kind of
abstraction does not exclude the following two possibilities:
(1) pricing function may be time-varying according to NDN
routers’ capabilities and other situations of the network, like
congestion and so forth; (2) Each end user has their own
utility function that determines how much he/she is willing
to pay for an interest request, although after submitting
his/her interest request, all related NDN router nodes will
charge PIT delay fee (i.e., pdf) and content delivering fee
(i.e., cdf) regardless of which kind of interests/contents is
requested/delivered. In fact, in our micropayment system, we
can adopt the following price model:
Price = max {0, −𝑈 (utility) + 𝐶 (opportunity cost)} , (1)
where both the utility function 𝑈 and the opportunity cost
(this indicates the potential cost of giving bandwidth to the
coming request while not giving to others) function 𝐶 can
be established in an adaptive manner, according to the long
term competition and balance between the requests and the
responses of NDN network services.
In the scenario of mitigating TCP SYN flooding attacks,
Mankins et al. tested four different pricing functions [18]:
(i) Constant function (𝑝 = 𝑘): the price 𝑝 is set to
constant 𝑘 regardless of its level of consumption.
(ii) Linear function (𝑝 = 𝑘𝑐): 𝑝 is proportional to the
value of a chosen market observable 𝑐 such as the
number of current connections.
(iii) Asymptotic function (𝑝 = 𝑘𝐵/(𝐵 − 𝑐)): 𝑝 is raised
asymptotically to infinity as the market observable 𝑐
approaches its limitation 𝐵.
(iv) Exponential function (𝑝 = 𝛼𝑒𝛽𝑐): 𝑝 is raised in the
fastest manner with respect to the increasing value of
the market observable 𝑐.
In fact, we can see that these pricing functions are reason-
able inwide anduniversal scenarios and they are independent
of concrete architectures. For example, the asymptotic pricing
strategy is useful in safeguarding a resource with a hard limit
in capacity, while the exponential pricing strategy is effective
in controlling consumption of a critical resource [18]. The
thing left is to consider how to use them, respectively, for
mitigating interesting flooding attack in NDN.
(1) Constant Pricing Function. With the purpose of pro-
viding steady service, it seems that the simplest way
is to use constant pricing strategy for forwarding
incoming interest requests within the same time-
window and with the same local connection degree.
However, we think it is not suitable for our scenario:
first, NDN architecture is topology-insensitive but
constant pricing function should be, at least locally,
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 7
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Figure 6: Simulation on linear pricing strategy (𝑘 = 0.3).
topology-aware; second, constant pricing function
will charge IFA nodes with an unbiasedmind, but our
main motivation is to punish IFA nodes and the so-
called unbiasedmind towardsmalicious nodes will be
unfair for legitimate nodes. Therefore, for mitigating
IFA attacks, we will not suggest using constant pricing
function.
(2) Linear Pricing Function. Since the concept of connec-
tion is not explicitly modeled in NDN architecture,
we associate 𝑐 in the related pricing functions to the
number of interest requests coming from some ports.
As a result, whenever amalicious node, denoted byA,
launches IFA attacks, the numbers of interest requests
in PIT tables of A’s upstreaming nodes increase
linearly. This in turn induces linear increment of
chargingA’s prepaid. When it is used out, the related
interest request will be discarded. As for legitimate
nodes, this kind of accumulation of interest request
will not occur in PIT tables of the upstreaming nodes;
thus the charge will be much small.
(3) Asymptotic Pricing Function. Here, 𝑐 is also associated
with the related pricing functions to the number of
interest requests coming from some ports, while 𝐵
is associated with the maximum number of interest
requests that can be accepted by an upstreaming node.
We will use asymptotic pricing function for basically
charging PIT delay fee (i.e., pdf) (here, the term
“basically” means the least charging without consid-
ering the further delay of PIT entries in PIT tables).
That is, when the local PIT table becomes almost
occupied, a NDN router node has to charge hugely
for newly incoming interest requests. By using this
8 Mathematical Problems in Engineering
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Figure 7: Simulation on asymptotical pricing strategy (𝑘 = 1, 𝐵 = 333).
mechanism, downstreamingNDNnodes or end users
are encouraged to submit/forward interest requests
to those upstreaming nodes with more empty PIT
entries.This is reasonable just like queue systems with
multiple service windows in economic life.
(4) Exponential Pricing Function. The preserved PIT
delay fee will be consumed according to exponential
pricing function.This kind of charging can be viewed
as incremental charging PIT delay fee and it will be
an exponential function of delayed time in PIT table.
This is rational since PIT entries are critical resource
and thus cannot be occupied for long time by some
“dead entries” (here, “dead entries” indicate those
interest requests that cannot find matched contents).
To charge content delivering fee (i.e., cdf) in NDN, as
well as in today’s Internet, is a subtle problem. We know
that bandwidth is also a critical resource. It seems that we
should use exponential pricing function. However, this will
encourage end users to split a single large request (say,
“please download the whole book for me”) into several small
requests (say, “please download the 𝑖th chapter of the book
for me”) if they do not mind the delay of contents of the
later chapters.This is unexpected since it runs in the opposite
direction with respect to the “best effort” mechanism that
is widely accepted in today’s Internet and will continue to
be useful in future Internet architectures, including NDN.
Therefore, we suggest using asymptotic pricing function for
charging content delivering fee. Partial reason for doing this
is that within the same time-window and with the same
local topology of network bandwidth has fixed limitation and
from the view of NDN router node, local available bandwidth
might be less critical than PIT entries.
In summary, the utilization of different pricing functions
in NDN can be tabulated in Table 2.
3.4. Paying or Charging Content Producers? Seemingly, it
is also reasonable to pay content producers, just like in
economic life. However, since NDN architecture tries to play
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Figure 8: Simulation on exponential pricing strategy (𝛼 = 1, 𝛽 = 0.02).
Table 2: Utilization of pricing functions in NDN.
Pricing functions Utilities/properties
Linear Charging local interest request and PITdelay fee will increase linearly.
Asymptotic PIT delay fee will become huge when PITtable reaches its limitations.
Exponential The incremental PIT delay fee willincrease exponentially.
down the concept of addressing and considering that many
content packets will be cached in networking, the content
producers cannot always fetch the real end users, and some
NDN router node might be the last hop for forwarding
interest request to content producers. Thus, the end users
and the NDN routers have no sufficient prior knowledge
to make proper prepayments to content producers. In fact,
according to our abstraction of the proposed prototype, NDN
router nodes need not consider the semantics of contents.
Instead, NDN nodes just provide services of interests looking
up and content delivering. In other words, NDN nodes play
merely the role of logistics distribution, instead of the role of
purchasing agents. Therefore, we suggest not to pay content
producers. Moreover, in order to encourage NDN router
nodes to perform better content delivering service, we can
even ask content producers to pay NDN router nodes, and
in return content producers can obtain what they deserved
directly from the end users based on (post)accounting and
auditing mechanisms. By doing so, another problem arises:
How to protect content producers’ benefits if a NDN router
node sends many copies of some popular contents to many
end users? Fortunately, this problem is essentially the issue
of digital rights management (DRM) that has been studies
extensively and there are a lot of mature solutions [26]. In
other words, even if a NDN router node distributes many
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Figure 9: Simulation on a net-like topology.
copies of certain content, it merely gets multiple of content
delivering fees, instead of the fee regarding the semantics and
the quality of the content. If it charges more, it will face the
risk of being detected and then have to afford punitive over-
charging according to DRM or (post)auditing mechanisms.
4. Simulations and Evaluations
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, we
conduct related simulations by using ndnSIM [16]. Our
simulation is run over a PC workstation with 2.93GHz
CPU and 2GB memory. The operation system is Win-
dows 7, but the configurations and newly added specifica-
tions/functionalities of nsnSIM are implemented in Ubuntu
that is running over a virtual machine created by VMware
Workstation.
Our simulations are organized according to two different
network topologies. The first is a very simple and tree-like
topology that is merely used to illustrate our basic idea
(see Figure 5(a)), while the second is a net-like topology
that is randomly generated (see Figure 5(b)). For the first
topology, there are in total 5 attack nodes (see grey nodes
in Figure 5(a)) and they launch attack 5 seconds after the
beginning of the corresponding simulations. For the second
topology, we assume that all nodes behave normally at
the beginning of the simulations, while after 4 seconds, 25
among them (i.e., about 15%) are randomly selected and
specified as malicious. In both topologies, we, respectively,
use linear pricing function, asymptotical pricing function,
and exponential pricing function in charging PIT delay fee. In
our simulations, the prepayment of an interest request is set
to 100, and the maximum number of PIT items is set to 1000.
Then, we collect related data and observe the evolution of
not only the pricing function values, but also the numbers of
unsatisfied interest requests in the related PIT tables (i.e., PIT
item numbers) and the degree of satisfactory interest requests
that is evaluated simply by the ratio of 𝑛𝑠/(𝑛𝑠 + 𝑛𝑢), where
𝑛𝑠 (resp., 𝑛𝑢) is the number of satisfied (resp., unsatisfied)
interest requests.
Results are depicted in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively.
(1) From Figures 6(a), 7(a), and 8(a), we can see different
tendencies with different pricing functions. Note that
in these pricing functions we always associate 𝑐 in the
related pricing functions with the number of interest
requests coming from some ports, but based on our
repeat testing we find that the results are a bit sensitive
to other parameters like 𝑘, 𝐵, 𝛼, 𝛽, and so forth. In
our simulations, we set these parameters based on the
experience obtained from our earlier tests.
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(2) From Figures 6(b), 7(b), and 8(b), we learn that on
one hand, compared to the strategy without charging,
these pricing functions are indeed effective for keeping
PIT tables from being quickly used out; on the other
hand, compared among these pricing functions, the
utility ratio of PIT tables with asymptotical pricing
strategy is highest, while the utility ratio of PIT tables
with exponential pricing strategy is lowest.
(3) From Figures 6(c), 7(c), and 8(c), we learn that,
compared to the strategy without charging, these
pricing functions are indeed effective for keeping high
satisfactory ratio for newly coming interest requests on a
long view. But, this time, asymptotical pricing strategy
does not manifest remarkable advantages over linear
pricing strategy and exponential pricing strategy. In
fact, the utility ratio of PIT tables and the satisfactory
ratio for newly coming interest requests are interac-
tions. To keep higher utility ratio of PIT tables means
setting aside less room for newly coming interest
requests and thus leading to lower satisfactory ratio.
Therefore, we have to choose a balance between them.
With this in mind, we think, as for the first simple
topology, asymptotical pricing strategy outperforms
the other two.
(4) However, from Figure 9, we can see that, as for
the second topology, which is even close to real
situations, asymptotical pricing strategy will lead to
lowest satisfactory ratio for newly coming interest
requests on a long view. Interestingly, linear pricing
function outperforms the other two in this case. Again
the proverb seems to be validated: the simpler, the
better.
5. Summary and Future Work
An initial analysis of possibility of using economic levers
in fighting interest flooding attacks (IFA) in Named Data
Networking (NDN) is presented. We started by presenting
a prototype for NDN that consists of seven basic business
logics/steps, followed by an examination of compatibilities of
existing micropayment systems and an analysis of utilization
of some well-known pricing functions in NDN. Then, some
basic simulations based on ndnSIM are developed and the
results show that it is indeed effective for fighting IFA. Clearly,
this is only the first step towards fighting DoS/DDoS in NDN
with economic levers. More work is required to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed prototype and to locate
possible mismatched aspects of detailed business logics,
such as the sensitiveness of different pricing functions with
different setting on related parameters. Moreover, testbed-
based, instead of simulation-based, experiments are needed
for determining the real impacts of different micropayments
and pricing functions on IFA in NDN.
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